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NOTES
THE LAW ScHOoL-The anticipated falling off in First Year enrollment
has not taken place. Our entering class is in fact five larger than last year; the
total registration in all three classes is two larger than that of last season..Attention was called last November to the upward trend in the numbers coming from colleges other than the University of Pennsylvania. This movement
is again marked.' The proportion of those coming from distant homes has,
however, slightly decreased,3 as might be expected under the present financial
strain of support away from the student's family.
Measures of economy have been forced by present conditions upon all
departments of the University, but by careful adjustments we have reduced to
a minimum the consequent interference with the normal program. Quasi Contracts and Domestic Relations have been temporarily dropped from the Second
Year roster and Insurance from the Third Year. Laurence H. Eldredge, Esq.,
LL. B., 1927, of the office of Montgomery and McCracken, Philadelphia, will
aid Professor Bohlen in the conduct of the Seminar in Tort Problems. Last
year we announced that Partnerships and Private Corporations would hereafter be merged under one subject head, Business Associations, which would be
carried through two years. Last year's Second Year Class was the first group
to receive instruction from this new angle. This year both Second and Third
Class enrollment:

First Year
Second Year
Third Year
Graduate and unclassified

1932-33

18o
121

105
9

Total

1933-34

185
125

98
9

417
DEGREE DIsTRmuTroN

University of Pennsylvania:
32
College
Wharton
19
Miscellaneous
2
53
Other Institutions:
Albright
I
Amherst
I
Brown
2
Bucknell
4
I
Carnegie Tech
Cornell
I
Dartmouth
3
Dickinson
2
Franklin & Marshall
6
Georgetown
2
Gettysburg
2
Haverford
II

Harvard
Hiram
Holy Cross
Juniata
Lafayette
La Salle
Lehigh
Mount St. Joseph's
Muhlenberg
New Mexico
Notre Dame
Ohio State
Ohio Wesleyan
Pennsylvania Military
College
Pennsylvania State
Pittsburgh
Princeton

From University of Pennsylvania
From other Colleges

1932-33

31+%
68+%

Rochester
Rutgers
St. Joseph's
Susquehanna
Swarthmore
Temple
Union
United States Naval
Academy
University of Delaware
University of Kansas
Ursinus
Villanova
Williams
Yale
Foreign
Total
1933-34
28+%
71+%

GEOGRAPHICAL DisTIUTioN

Philadelphia
Pennsylvania (outside Philadelphia)
Other States and Foreign Countries

1932-33

38+%
48+%
13+%

1933-34
41+%

46+%
12+%
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Year classes will work upon the problems of the changing law of group rights
and liabilities with a more modem approach.
The new materials used in the Second Year course are being constantly
molded as experience in the class room suggests improvement. A third year
course in advanced problems in the law of corporations has been established
under the direction of Professor Frey and Mr. Thomas K. Finletter of the
New York Bar. The content of this course will be kept flexible and subject
to variation from year to year to meet current situations. This year the mimeographed material employed will relate principally to Law and Accountancy,
Corporate Reorganization and Receivership, Issuance of Securities and Vergers and Consolidations.
Professor John Dickinson, appointed last spring to the position of First
Assistant Secretary of the Department of Commerce, Washington, continues
his courses in Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, and Public Service Corporations.
I am happy to use this occasion to acknowledge our gratefulness to judge
George Gowen Parry of the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia, and to those
alumni who contributed with him towards the expense of cleaning the valuable
collection of law engravings which hang in our class rooms. To Philip Price,
Esq., we also express our appreciation of a large gift, mainly of English material, from the library of his father, the late Eli Kirk Price, for many years
President of the Law Alumni.
The Pennsylvania Bar examinations held in July were passed by 71.9 per
cent. of those coming up with degrees from our Law School. The percentage
of all candidates was 43.3.
Students excluded for a year for scholastic deficiency, but entitled to reexamination for reinstatement, are now permitted under a late ruling of the
Faculty to attend their failed courses as auditors. It is hoped that this provision for an ordered program of review will lead to a more successful subsequent history for this group both in the Law School and at the Bar examinations.
Herbert F. Goodrich.
TAXABILITY OF POWERS OF APPOINTMENT UNDER

STATE AND

FEDERAL

STATUTES-Powers of appointment have long been known to the common
law as a facile and useful method of conferring interests in land.' Their development was fostered by Chancery in connection with uses prior to 1535 and
thereafter in connection with trusts.2 In the course of the three centuries
following the Statute of Uses, powers were gradually developed and classified,
analogies with shifting and springing uses, of which powers constituted the
most useful and convenient applications, having been of no uncommon occurrence.3 A power of appointment was regarded as an authority to do an act
in relation to real property, or to the creation of an estate therein, which the
owner, granting the power, might himself lawfully perform. 4 In itself, it comprised no interest or estate in land.' It represented merely a right of disposition which the grantor (the donor of the power) vested in the grantee (the
'See CHANCE, PowERs (1841) ; FARWErU, PowERs (3d ed. 1916) ; SUGDEN, PowERs (8th
ed. 1861). No reference will be made in this note to powers of revocation, which, in themselves, comprise a distinct field of taxation.
SGoODEVE AND POTTER, MODERN LAW OF REAI PROPERTY (5th ed. 1929) 345; see BURDICK, REAL PROPERTY (1914) § 268 et seq.
' GOODrVE AND POTTER, loc. cit. supra note

455.

2; WILLIAMs, REAL PROPERTY (24th ed. 1926)
op. cit. supranote 2, at 723; GOODEVE AND POTrER, op. cit. supra note 2, at
344.
1Eaton v. Straw, 18 N. H. 320 (1846) ; BuWIcK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 724.

' BuRnicK,
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donee) to be exercised in favor of another (the appointee). Despite having
granted the power, the donor's interest in his land remained intact and, as a logical development, when the power was exercised, the appointee's interest in
the land was derived from the instrument creating the power." Thus the appointee was considered as taking directly from the donor.
If the power, granted by will or deed, was sufficiently extensive, so as to
include anyone whom the donee might nominate, even himself, the power was
considered to be general. But if the donee was limited in his appointment to a
specific class, or to certain designated persons, the power was deemed to be
limited or special.' Numerous other classes of powers were developed by conveyancers I but are unimportant in the present discussion.
One of the problems arising early in the law in connection with the use
of powers of appointment was the rights of the creditors of the donee in the
property which the donee's general power of appointment controlled. As long
as the donee could pay his obligations, or, being unable to do so and the power
remaining unexercised, the rights of creditors were not involved.9 But where
the donee was insolvent and the general power was exercised, the situation was
deemed to require different treatment. If the appointee was a volunteer, Chancery, in its historic zeal to defeat the claim of this legal parasite, would impress
the property with the claims of creditors.10 The Chancellor reasoned that since
the donee was empowered to appoint himself, what better motive than the payment of his debts should impel the donee to exercise in his own favor? Acceptance of this doctrine was not long postponed by many American courts; 11
indeed, in several of the states statutes have gone beyond this remedy and allow
creditors to reach the property even before appointment. 12 A number of others,
including Pennsylvania, have remained adamant and have refused to honor its
dictates.'
It is significant that both the English '14 and American 15 Bankruptcy
Acts empower a trustee in bankruptcy to exercise, in favor of the donee's
estate, a general power of appointment.
When Congress and many of the state legislatures enacted statutes taxing
the transfer of property at death, or in contemplation of death, it was intended
that existing powers of appointment were within their purview, though such
intention was not expressly denoted in the acts. Applying the common law
principle that the appointee takes directly from the donor, both state 16 and
'Christy v. Pulliam, 17 IIl. 59 (1855) ;

FARwELL,

op. cit. suepra note 2, at 331;

KALEs,

FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1920) 707; SUGDEN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 470.
'GOODEVE AND POTTER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 352; 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d

ed.

192o) § 315.
8 See GOODEVE AND POTTER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 348, 349.
o Holmes v. Coghill, 12 Ves. 206 (Eng. i8o6); FARWELL, op. cit. supra note 2, at 286.
For excellent treatment of appointive property as assets of a bankrupt estate, see I TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 332.
' Jones v. Clifton, 1OI U. S. 225 (188o) ; Security Trust Co. v. Ward, io Del. Ch. 408,
93 Atl. 385 (1915) ; Russell v. Joys, 227 Mass. 263, 268, 116 N. E. 549, 550 (1917) ; Holmes
v. Coghill, supranote 9; Note (1929) 59 A. L. R. 1510 et seq.
Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200 (1879) ; Freeman's Adm'r v. Butters, 94 Va. 406,
26 S. E. 845 (1897) ; (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 422; (1929) 38 YAL L. J. 395.
"ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 6928; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8115; N. Y. REAL
PROPERTY LAW (1917) § 159; WIS. STAT. (93)
§§ 232.20, 232.30.
"Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. 277 (1849) ; Rhode Island Hospital Co. v. Anthony,
49 R. I. 339, 142 Atl. 531 (1928) ; Note (1929), 59 A. L. R. 151o at 1523. For a vigorous
attack on the principle, see the opinion of Chief Justice Gibson in the Duffield case, supra.
144 & 5 GEo. V., c. 59, s. 38 (2b) (I914), I HALS. LAws 644 (1929).
344
STAT. 667 (1926), II U. S. C. A. § iO (Supp. 1932).
'In re Higgins, 194 Iowa 369, 189 N. W. 752 (1922) ; State v. United States Trust Co.,
99 Kan. 841, 163 Pac. 156 (1917); Winn v. Schenck, 33 Ky. 615, iio S. W. 827 (19o8);
Emmons v. Shaw, 171 Mass. 410, 5o N. E. 1033 (1898) ; Matter of Harbeck, 161 N. Y. 211,
55 N. E. 850 (igoo) ; GLEASON & Oris, INHERITAC TAXATION (4th ed. 1925) 346; RoBmSON, SAVING TAXES (1930)

18.
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federal :" courts held the statutes inapplicable where such power was in existence prior to the passage of the act, the donor having died. Since the statutes
made no express provision for the taxing of powers of appointment, the courts
applied the usual formula that in order to impose a tax a transfer at death must
have taken place. And since the donee takes directly from the donor, the property passing under the exercise of a power could not be taxed since the donor
had been dead before the taxing act was in effect. To impose a tax on existing powers of appointment, the courts held, the statute must expressly so provide.
Thus, the enactments failed to reach many opulent life tenancies whose
devolution depended upon powers, and revision was in order. New York led
the way, andi in 189718 amended its act to provide that a tax should be imposed
upon the exercise of a power of appointment, whether by deed or will, in the
same manner as though the property belonged absolutely to the donee of the
power. The amendment served as a model for other states.'
Courts held the
amendment imposed a valid tax on the exercise of a power even though such
power was created prior to the passage of the amendment. 20 In other words,
the defense of retroactivity, fatal to the application of the act prior to the
amendment, was now ineffective. The United States Supreme Court found
in it no constitutional infraction. 2 ' State courts, in refuting the argument that
the act was retroactive, reasoned that the tax was imposed on a transfer and
that the transfer did not become complete until the appointment was made, and
at that time the law was in effect. But this reasoning might well have been
applied to the statutes before they were amended. Probably the reason for
holding the tax valid, after the amendment, was that a tax was expressly imposed and the courts were unable to avoid its effect. Before the amendment,
the courts, because of the statute's silence as to powers of appointment, were
able to dismiss its validity on interpretative grounds.
Though the statute required an obvious break with the existing state of
the law, courts repeatedly held that it was not designed to change the common
law. 22

The appointee was still recognized as successor in title of the donor. 23

Only for purposes of taxation was the donee treated as the appointee's predecessor in title. With the latter as a starting point, the rate of tax has been
determined by the relationship of the appointee to the donee, 24 and valuation of
the estate is made at the time of appointment rather than at the time of the
creation of the power. With few exceptions, of which Pennsylvania is one,2 5
'United States v. Field, 255 U. S. 257, 41 Sup. Ct. 256 (1920); Lederer v. Pearce, 266
Fed. 497 (C. C. A. 3d, 192o) ; Ebersole v. McGrath, 271 Fed. 995 (S. D. Ohio, ig2o).
N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1923) c. 284, § 220, s. 6.
GLEASON & OTIS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 349; PINKERTON AND MnLSAPS, INHERITANCE TAXATION (1926) 131; ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 16, at 19.
'Matter of Vanderbilt, 163 N. Y. 597, 57 N. E. 1127 (19oo) ; Montague v. State, 163
Wis. 58, 157 N. W. 508 (1916).
"Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278, 22 Sup. Ct. 213 (19o2) ; Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U. S.
466, 27 Sup. Ct. 550 (1907).

Simes, The Devolution of Title to Appointed Property_(I928) 22 ILL. L. Ray. 480, 5og.
fId. at 511; Manning v. Board of Tax Commissioners, 46 R. I. 400, 127 At. 865 (1925).
"-In re Luques, 114 Me. 235, 95 Atl. IO2I (1915) ; In re Rogers' Estate, 71 App. Div.
461, 75 N. Y. Supp. 835 (I9o2), aff'd 172 N. Y. 617, 64 N. E. 1125 (1902). Contra: Hill v.
Treasurer, 229 Mass. 474, 118 N. E. 891 (I918) ; Bullitt's Est., 26 Dist. R. 566 (Pa. 1917).
In North Carolina and Rhode Island, by statute, the rate is determined by the relationship
of the appointee to the donor. N. C. CODE (1931) § 7880 (I) ; R. I. Gen. Laws (1929) C.
1355, § 4. In New York, where there is a failure to exercise the power, the relationship of
the appointee to the donor determines the tax. N. Y. TRANSF. TAX REG. (1926) Arts. 91
and 92.
' Highfield v. Delaware Trust Co., 152 At. 124 (Del. 193o), aff'g 152 AUt. 117 (Del.
Super. 1929). Pennsylvania so provides by statute. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 72,
§ 2301.
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the tax is levied on the estate of the donee.2 6 Under the federal statute, even
if the proper tax has been paid on the transfer from the donor at his death,
there is a further tax to be paid on the tranfer under the appointment from
However, where a general power has been exercised within five
the donee."
years from the imposition of the first tax, the donee's estate is exempt from
further levy.28 In some state courts, especially New York, the only remedy
open to the donee's estate where the tax has been once imposed, is to seek a
modification of the order taxing the donor's estate. 29 The harshness of the
New York rule is apparent, and its adoption by other states has not been general.
When imposing the tax, the statutes of the various states make no distinction as to the extent of the dominion over the property exercisable by the donee.
All powers of appointment, whether general or special, are taxable. 0 This summary treatment of the donee seems, on its face, to be little short of arbitrary.
A tax is imposed on the donee's estate where he exercises a minimum of control
in the same degree as where he exercises the greatest possible control.
The Federal Estate Tax Act,2 1 however, distinguishes between general and
special powers, and declares that only property passing under a general power
of appointment should be included, for tax purposes, in the gross estate of the
donee.3 2 But the importance of this distinction must, of necessity, vary with
the interpretations of the courts when confronted, in particular cases, with
powers of appointment. The first question to arise is, did Congress have in
mind the common law distinctions between general and special powers when
it enacted the statute? If so, will effect be given to the statute by adhering to
such distinctions ?
The commonest case arising under this section of the Act involves the situation in which the donee is given power to appoint in favor of anyone, but is
limited to its exercise by will. To place the power in the category of general
powers, the common law required the right to exercise the power both by will
2' Stratton v. United States, 5o F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. Ist, 1931), certioraridenied 284 U. S.
651, 52 Sup. Ct. 31 (ig3i) ; Matter of Dow's Estate, 167 N. Y. 227, 6o N. E. 439 (19O) ;
GLEAsoN & OTIS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 348. But in New York if the donee fails to exercise
the power, the tax is assessed on estate of donor. In re Duff, 114 Misc. 309, 186 N. Y. Supp.

259 (1921).
- RoBINSON, op.

cit. supra note 16, at 81.
8Ibid.
'Re Tillinghast, 94 Misc. 50, 157 N. Y. Supp. 382 (I916), aff'd 184 App. Div. 886, 170
N. Y. Supp. III6 (1918).
'Burnham v. Treasurer, 212 Mass. 165, 98 N. E. 603 (1912) ; Matter of Dow's Est.,
supra note 26; Montague v. State, supra note 2o; Bentley, Inheritance Taxation on Powers
of Appointment (1929) 23 ILL. L. Rxv. 446, 451; RoBINsoN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 23.
'The federal act, as amended, in 1926, reads: "The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real
or personal, tangible, or intangible, wherever situated ...

(f) To the extent of any property passing under a general power of appointment exercised by the decedent (I) by will, or (2) by deed executed in contemplation of, or intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after, his death..... except in case of a
bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth". 44 STAT.
70 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § I094f (1928).
This section of the Act was amended in June, 1932, by inserting between the words "at
or after, his death" and "except in case of a bona fide sale", the following: "or (3) by deed
under which he has retained for his life or any period not ascertainable without reference to
his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death (A) the posession or
enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or (B) the right, either alone
or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the
property or the income therefrom, . . . 47 STAT. 279 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1o94f
(Supp. 1932).

"Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 29 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) ; Leser v.
Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931) ; Surrey and Aronson, Inter Vivos Transfers
and the Federal Estate Tax (1932) 32 Co. L. Rav. 1332, 136o.
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or deed. Only in this way was it possible for the donee, during his lifetime,
to appoint himself. But the courts avoided this apparent obstacle, when confronted with it, and, while pronouncing continued adherence to the precepts
3
of the established law, held such a power to be general, and taxable as such."
The fact that the donee could not exercise the power for his own benefit during
his lifetime did not interfere with its being a general power under the federal
act.34
In Whitlock-Rose v. McCaughn3 5 the Circuit Court of Appeals found
"general" not to refer to the mode or manner of the exercise of the power, but to
the "absence of limitations" on the power when exercised in the prescribed
3
manner. Yet several years earlier in Fidelity Trust Co. v. McCaughn the
same jurisdiction held a power not to be general where it was limited to disposition by will on condition that the donee remain unmarried, even though the
donee did, in fact, remain unmarried and exercised the power. So long as the
donee remained unmarried, there was no "absence of limitations". She might
have appointed anyone. Her dominion over the appointive property, so long
as she remained unmarried, was no less than the dominion of the donee in the
Whitlock-Rose case. Moreover, the two cases are directly contradictory in
their definitions of a general power of appointment within the meaning of the
statute. The Fidelity case defines it thus:
"A general power of appointment

.

. . is of such a character that

the donee of it has actual and practical dominion of the property 3 7as fully
to all practical intents and purposes as if it were owned outright".
Inasmuch as the Whitlock-Rose case represents a later adjudication, it must be
case. Subsequent decisions
taken as limiting the ratio decidendi of the Fidelity
38
of the federal courts support this conclusion.
A power of appointment will not be regarded as special, to avoid the tax,
where a limitation arises from the inherent nature of the property controlled,
rather than from any restriction as to the exercise of the power itself. It is
immaterial if the property is a fee or less; if the interest be legal or equitable;
or if enjoyment is to take place at present or in the future.39
"The important thing is the latitude of the donee's powers of disposiof the interest which he may dispose of, or
tion, rather than the quantum
4
the time of its vesting". 0
We may conclude, then, for federal estate tax purposes a power is regarded as
special when it is restricted by the donor to particular objects or beneficiaries;
a power is regarded as general when it is not restricted by the donor to particular objects or beneficiaries, even though the method of exercising it is restricted.
The federal courts having set forth what they regard as a general power
of appointment, and having repeatedly affirmed that a special power is to be
Minis v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 58 (1928), certioraridenied 278 U. S. 657, 49 Sup. Ct.
(2d) 6oo (C. C. A. 3d, 1929), certioraridenied 280 U. S. 602, 5o Sup. Ct. 152 (1929) ; Stratton v. United States, supra note 26;
Lee v. Commissioner, 57 F. (2d) 399 (App. D. C. I93I), certioraridenied 286 U. S. 562, 52
'

186 (1929) ; Fidelity-Phila. Trust Co. v. McCaughn, 34 F.

Sup. Ct. 645 (1932); Blackburne v. Brown, 43 F. (2d) 320 (C. C. A. 3d, 193o).

Fidelity-Phila. Trust Co. v. McCaughn, supra note 33.
F. (2d) 164 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927).

321
'

F. (2d) 987 (E. D. Pa. 1924).

Supra note 36, at 988.
See Surrey and Aronson, supra note 32, at 1361, 1362.
Fidelity-Phila. Trust Co. v. McCaughn, supra note 33.
"'PerKirkpatrick, District Judge, id. 6o4.
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excluded from the estate tax, it is surprising to note the dearth of litigated
cases involving special powers. An examination discloses that since the enactment of the statute in 1919, but three cases have been adjudicated in which a
special power of appointment was involved. In Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v.
Bowers,41 where the Astor trust was before the judges, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in 1928, held the power of appointment to be
special and the estate passing on its exercise to be exempt from taxation. In
Leser v. Burnet, 42 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in 1931,
held a power which prevented the donee from appointing his creditors to be
special. This conclusion was reached on the basis of Maryland law which holds
a power of appointment to be limited where the donee may not exercise it in
favor of his creditors. In Fidelity Trust Co. v. McCaughn,43 as already pointed
out, a power was held to be special where the donee could exercise it only if
she remained unmarried. However, the latter case should not be followed too
strictly, especially in the light of subsequent decisions, since unrestricted dominion over the property was there reposed in the donee.
The great majority of trust estates are created with the object in mind of
providing for specific beneficiaries after the settlor has died. It would seem,
then, that draftsmen might well bear in mind the important distinction between
general and special powers to avoid the payment of unnecessary taxes and still
provide for all reasonable contingencies. Thus, in the ordinary case of an
irrevocable trust with income payable to someone other than the settlor, the
appointees might be restricted to a special group, such as the heirs of the donee,
or those who would take under the state law if the donee died intestate. The
power would then be special, and the federal estate tax would thus be avoided.
A problem which has caused the courts a great deal of concern and which
has given rise to a well-defined difference of opinion is the taxability of property
controlled by a power of appointment where the donee either has failed to make
disposition of the property, or where he has exercised the power in favor of
one who would have taken on default of such exercise. The difficulty arose
when New York in 1897'4 passed an amendment to its statute, providing, in
substance, that the failure or omission to exercise a power of appointment subjects the property to a transfer tax in the same manner as if the donee of the
power had owned the property and devised it by will. This provision was
copied verbatim by several other states. 45
Lansing's Estate 46 was the first case in which this provision was involved
to come before the New York Court of Appeals. There, the appointee would
have taken the identical property had the donee failed to exercise his power.
The donee, however, exercised the power, but the appointee elected to take
under the donor's will. The court, without hesitation, held the provision of the
statute to be unconstitutional, and refused to permit the assessment of a tax,
saying, "where there is no transfer there is no tax". A short time later the
same court had occasion to review its decision in Slosson's Estate,47 and reiterated the conclusion reached in the Lansing case, and, though unnecessary in
the case before it, stated in no uncertain language that the decision would have
been the same had the donee failed to exercise his power of appointment and
had the legatee taken under the donor's will. The New York legislature, in
a Supra note 32.
Supra note 32.
' Supra note 36.
Supra note 18.
See GLF-AsoN & OTIs, op. cit. supra note 16, at 349.
46 182 N. Y. 238, 74 N. E. 882 (195o).
117216 N. Y. 79, IiO N. E. 166 (1911).
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1911,4" shortly after the decision in the Slosson case, repealed the unconstitutional provision.
While several of the states which had copied the provision followed New
York in repealing it, 49 the majority of them retained it on their statute books
and, refusing to be influenced by the New York court, proceeded to give it the
fullest possible effect."0 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was
presented with the first opportunity of reviewing the act following Lansing's
Estate, and in Minot v. Treasurer,"' where the donee failed to exercise the
power, upheld its constitutionality and imposed a tax on the donee's estate.
The' court, in subsequent cases,5 2 reaffirmed its decision, which has been followed by many of the remaining states which had adopted the language of the
New York act. 3 While the New York and Massachusetts cases can be distinguished on their facts, the New York cases involving actual exercise of the
power with an election by the appointee to take under the donor's will and the
Massachusetts cases involving defaults of exercise, the language of the courts
is irreconcilable. It would seem, though no case has been found, that the Massachusetts court would affirm the imposition of a tax if the power was exercised, notwithstanding an election by the appointee to take under the donor's
will. While Congress did not adopt the New York amendment, nor language
similar to it, the federal courts interpret the federal statute as imposing a valid
tax on property passing under a general power of appointment where the appointee would have taken the same property in default of the exercise.'; The
question of the validity of a tax if the power was not exercised has not been
raised.
The theory on which the Massachusetts court seeks justification is that
the presence of a power in one vests in him the "possibility of disposition", and
that a failure to exercise a power is as much a disposal of property as if the
donee, in fact, had executed the power. In other words, by refraining to act
the donee has disposed of property with the same effect as if he had acted.
Since he might have named anyone as the recipient of property, his default
thereof amounts to an appointment in favor of the person who takes under the
donor's will. The New York court, on the other hand, reasons that the donee,
in both situations, takes no part in the disposition of the property, and fails

IN. Y. TRANsF. TAX LAw (1911). If the power is exercised to dispose of part of the
property different from the way in which it would have gone if there had been no exercise,
the tax will apply to that part only. Matter of Ripley, 122 App. Div. 419, io6 N. Y. Supp.
844 (19o7), aff'd 192 N. Y. 536, 84 N. E. 112o (i9o8). If the donee makes material changes
in the devolution, the rule in the Lansing case will not apply. In re Cooksey, 182 N. Y. 92,
74 N. E. 88o

(1905).

' Murphy's Estate, 182 Cal. 740, 19o Pac. 46 (192o) ; see GLEASON & OrIs, op. cit. supra

note 16, at 350.
' ROBINSON, op. cit. supra note 16, at 20.
U1207 Mass. 588, 93 N. E. 973 (1911).

' Burnham v. Treasurer, supra note 30; see Attorney General v. Thorpe, 230 Mass. 19,
iig N. E. 191 (1918).

'
Manning v. Board of Tax Commissioners, supra note 23, where the tax was assessed
on the donor's estate. For complete table of jurisdictions taxing transfers on non-exercise of
powers, see PINKERTON AND MIL.LSAPS, op. cit. supra note 19, at 136.
' In Grant v. Commissioner, 13 B. T. A. 174 (1928), the Board of Tax Appeals refused
to impose a tax in this situation. However, Hancy v. Commissioner, 17 B. T. A. 464 (1929)
expressly overruled the Grant case and imposed a tax. In Bishop v. Commissioner, 23 B. T.
A. 920 (1931), the same situation was involved. The Board accepted the decision of the
Hancy case, expressly stating that it did so on the authority of Tyler v. United States, 281
U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct. 356 (193o). The Tyler case, however, was not precisely on point
since a tenancy by the entirety, and not a power of appointment, was involved. However,
the same reasoning should apply to both situations. Lee v. Commissioner, supra note 33, and
Wear v. Commissioner, 26 B. T. A. 682 (1932) have reiterated the conclusions of the Bishop
and Tyler cases.
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to give the appointee or legatee more than the latter already enjoys. In other
words, the donee should not be taxed for transferring property at his death
when he, in fact, failed to make a transfer. Logic and justice require a preference for the New York rule, but, it seems, the omnipresent need for government revenue is so far controlling that courts are willing to be guided by its
demands.
As has been pointed out, Pennsylvania is one of the few states which
tax the estate of the donor on the exercise of a power of appointment. Possibly as an offshoot of this condition, it has developed, peculiar unto itself, a
doctrine known as "blending". By means of this doctrine a tax is imposed on
the estate of the donee of a general power of appointment where by will he
discloses an intention to blend the appointed property with his own estate for
all purposes.55 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has found considerable
difficulty in applying the principle to specific cases; the determination of the
donee's intention constituting the chief problem. In Commonwealth v. Morris," the court laid down as the test, whether the donee had treated the two
estates as one for all purposes and manifested an intention to commingle
them generally. Subsequent cases have not disclosed any tendencies toward
expansion of the principle, but, if anything, give evidence of restricting its
application.5" No other jurisdiction has seen fit to adopt the doctrine of blending, and at least one court has aimed at it a volley of criticism.58
One of the perplexing problems of taxation which powers of appointment
have not been able to escape is that of jurisdiction. Which state has power
to tax when the donor is a resident of state A, the donee a resident of state B,
and the property passing under the exercise is located in the state of the donor's
domicil or the donee's domicil, or the property is located in one state and the
donor and donee are domiciled in a different state? In those states where the
appointed property is considered as passing from the donee, it might be expected that, under the doctrine of constructive situs as applicable to personalty,
the property would be taxed by the state of the donee's domicil, notwithstanding such property is located in a foreign state. Some jurisdictions so decide,5
but the majority hold to the contrary. Thus, in the California case of Estate
of Bowditch 60 no tax was imposed though the donee was a resident of California and the property was located in a foreign state of which the donor had
been a resident. The Supreme Court of the United States in Wachovia Bank
& Trust Co. v. Doughton 61 reached the same conclusion on similar facts,
though in so deciding it was necessary to reverse a decision of the Supreme
Court of North Carolina. Connecticut has followed the Wachovia case.02 New
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I McCord's Est., 276 Pa. 459, 12o Atl. 413 (923) ; Forney's Est., 280 Pa. 282, 124 Atl.
(1924) ; Twitchell's Est., 284 Pa. 135, 13o Atl. 324 (925).
W287 Pa. 6I, 134 Atl. 429 (1926).
" See Valentine's Est., 297 Pa. 99, 146 Atl. 453 (1929) ; Mayer's Est., 14 D. & C. 521

(Pa. 793o) ; see also Hagen's Est., 285 Pa. 326, 132 Atl. 175 (1926). The history of the
doctrine is interesting. It was first applied by judge Penrose of the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia in Stoke's Est., 20 W. N. C. 48 (Pa. 1887) where creditors claimed the donee exercised the power in distributing, along with his other assets, the property subject to the power.
"Blending" was argued by counsel for the creditors, Mr. John G. Johnson, in an endeavor to
defeat the effects of the Pennsylvania rule that creditors of a donee cannot lay claim to property passing under the exercise of a power. The court accepted the argument without citing
a single authority in its favor. "Blending" was reiterated by the same Judge in Finn's Est.
(No. 2), 18 Pa. Dist. 408 (s899). McCord's Estate, supra was the first pronouncement of
"blending" by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
t'McMurtry v. State, 111 Conn. 594, 151 Atl. 252 (1930).
' State v. Probate Court, 124 Minn. 508, 145 N. W. 390 (1914).
' 189 Cal. 377, 208 Pac. 282 (1922).
1272 U. S. 567, 47 Sup. Ct. 202 (1926).
' McMurtry v. State, supra note 58.

NOTES

Yoik,63 Massachusetts," 4 and Pennsylvania 65 are in accord with this view. The
test employed by these courts is the actual situs of the property, since the acts
of the donee in exercising the power do not give the state jurisdiction to tax.
Thus, Massachusetts " and New York 67 imposed a tax on property within
their borders though both the donor and donee were nonresidents. This test
is satisfactory since it reduces the possibility of multiple taxation, an evil which
the states have attempted to control by other measures.6 8 Under the rule of
the minority courts, both the state in which the donee is domiciled and the
state in which the property is located levy a tax on the donee's estate.
A question involved in almost every case in which counsel contest the
imposition of a federal tax on the exercise of a power of appointment, is the
status of the state law as a determinant of the validity of the tax. It is generally held that the laws of the state determine the property rights passing on the
exercise of a power."9 It is also a settled rule that a federal statute is to be
applied uniformly throughout the various states.70 While, at first glance, these
two principles appear to be in conflict, since the law differs in the various
states, the courts, though with a few exceptions, 71 find no difficulty in applying
them. Both are taken to mean that the laws of a state are binding on a federal
court insofar as the vesting of property interests are concerned, but when such
interests have been defined the further question of their taxability under the
federal estate law is controlled by federal decisions. 7 2 Thus, in Pennsylvania
Co. v. Lederer,75 the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
affirmed the assessment of a tax on the donee's estate notwithstanding that
under the law of Pennsylvania the appointees take, not under the will of the
donee, but under the will of the donor. And in the recent Supreme Court case
of Burnet v. Harne174 the highest federal court asserted that the taxability
of property passing by transfer depends solely on the federal statute, and that
the state law may control the operation of a federal taxing act only when Congress expressly or by implication so provides.
H.T.
03Re Brett, 123 Misc. 507, 205 N. Y. Supp. 154 (1922), aff'd 206 App. Div. 746, 200 N. Y.
Supp. 915 (1923); In re Canda's Est., 197 App. Div. 597, 189 N. Y. Supp. 917 (92);
cf.
Re Frazier, 188 N. Y. Supp. i89 (1912); Re Seaman, 187 N. Y. Supp. 254 (1913).
' Walker v. Treasurer, 221 Mass. 6oo, iog N. E. 647 (1915) ; cf. Gardiner v. Treasurer,
225 Mass. 355, 114 N. E. 617 (1916).
' See Commonwealth v. Duffield, supra note 13.
' It re Canda's Estate, supra note 63.
"Walker v. Treasurer, supra note 64.
' Many of the states have entered into "reciprocity" agreements in order to eliminate
multiple taxation of personal property. See RoBINsO N, op. cit. supra: note 16, at 45, for list
of states affected by such agreements.
'Lederer v. Pearce, supra note 17; Lederer v. Northern Trust Co., 262 Fed. 52 (C. C.

A. 3d,

192o).

' Fidelity Trust Co. v. McCaughn, supra note 36.
'See Leser v. Burnet, supra note 32.
" Stratton v. United States, supra note 26; Allen v. Henggeler, 32 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A.

8th, 1929), certiorari denied 280 U. S. 594, 50 Sup. Ct. 40 (1929) ; Blackburne v. Brown,
supra note 33.
3292 Fed. 629 (E. D. Pa. 1921).
74287 U. S. 103, 53 Sup. Ct. 74 (1932).

